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SUMMARY 
In the Third World, the function of political leadership is 
more pivotal than in western countries. The subjective factor 
of Qadhafi has vital bearing on developments in Libya. There 
was no historical neccessity for Libya to have developed along 
the revolutionary path that it has. The formation of the Arab 
Socialist Union, the Popular Revolution, the creation of the 
Jamahiriya, the inauguration of the Revolutionary Committee 
movement and the programme of militarisation - all these 
issues are a result of Qadhafi's wish to "revolutionarize" 
Libyan society. 
His ultimate aim was to eliminate all intermediaries between 
the people and the political power. In practice, real power 
remained in the hands of Qadhafi and the Revolutionary Com-
mittees . A drastic fall in oil revenues and the arrogance and 
arbitrariness of Qadhafi
1s revolutionary zealots led to grow-
ing discontent among the Libyan population. 
The American raid on Tripoli and Benghazi in April 1986 was 
meant to precipitate Qadhafi
1s downfall. But his regime was 
not overthrown and the Libyan leader proved to be a master of 
political survival. A (temporary) political and economic 
153 liberalisation has boosted his popularity. On the eve of the 
twentieth anniversary of the Libyan revolution, his position 
still seems to be secure. 
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1. THE 1969 COUP 
King Idris, who was in power since Libya's independence in 
1951, was dethroned on September 1, 1969 by members of a so-
called "Free Unionist Officer Movement". These young officers 
were disenchanted with the corruption surrounding the aging 
king, the prominence of foreigners in the Libyan economy, and 
Idris's pro-Western foreign policy. The coup d'état was led by 
a 27-year old officer, Mu'Ammar al Qadhafi (1), who became 
chairman of a twelve-member Revolutionary Command Council 
(RCC). 
The RCC announced on December 11, 1969 that the country's 1951 
independence constitution had been cancelled. In a new provi-
sional constitution Islam was proclaimed the state religion 
and Arabic its official language. Moreover, the state aimed at 
the realization of socialism through the enforcement of social 
justice. 
The RCC was the highest authority in the Libyan Arab Republic. 
It exercised supreme sovereignty and legislative power and set 
up the general policy of the state. To implement the state's 
general policy, the RCC appointed a Council of Ministers, 
which was responsible in its functions to the RCC and whose 
members might be dismissed by the RCC (2). 
A ban on political parties was maintained. A largely civilian 
cabinet was appointed, although it functioned under close 
military supervision. The principal force underlying the 
regime's policies was undoubtedly Arab nationalism (3). 
154 2. THE ARAB SOCIALIST UNION AND THE POPULAR REVOLUTION 
In June 1971 Qadhafi announced that an Arab Socialist Union 
(ASU) would be formed to constitute the country's single 
party. The main purpose of the ASU was "to eliminate class 
distinction, foster democracy and prevent the domination of 
any one class or person". 
Its organizational structure provided for a local conference 
and committee as its basic unit, a provincial conference and 
committee at the next level, and a General National Congress 
and the RCC at the apex of the pyramid (A). In a broader 
perspective, the Libyan ASU aimed at the unification of the 
Arab political institutions. It was consequently a copy of the 
Egyptian model (5). Furthermore, its formation nearly coin-
cided with the creation of the Federation of Arab Republics 
(FAR) between Libya, Egypt, and Syria. The FAR constitution 
was approved by referendum in September 1971 (6). 
The Libyan ASU performed as disappointingly as its Egyptian 
equivalent and did not succeed in stimulating Libyan political 
life. To counter the political lethargy of the Libyan popula-
tion, the popular or cultural revolution was launched on April 
15, 1973 at a public meeting in Zwara (7). 
On April 16, Qadhafi announced the formation of popular com-
mittees throughout the country and in all its institutions. 
Their role, he explained, was to ensure the control of the 
revolution from below. Their decisions, once approved by thé 
RCC, would be given legal character. By 15 August -the RCC 
deadline- more than 2200 committees had been formed in vil-
lages, cities, educational institutions, business-enterprises, 
etc. (8). 
Despite the disorder bordering on chaos in some institutions, 
the RCC never lost control of the situation. Qadhafi's politi-
cal purpose was achieved: the committees ferreted out and 
caused the dismissal of a number of actual or potential cri-
tics of the regime (9). But on the whole the episode of the 
popular revolution ended undecisively. Many of the new ac-
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(Archives 'Het Volk') tivists who had "seized" power in the popular committees, 
proved to be opportunists after personal power or to be as 
negligent and even more incompetent than the bureaucrats they 
were supposed to control. Ultimately, the popular revolution 
was not enough to definitively shift the balance of political 
power between Qadhafi and his rivals, and the conflict had to 
be decided in an outbreak of intra-elite violence at the apex 
of the state (10). 
3. THE ELABORATION OF THE SECOND INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 
3.1 The break up of the Revolutionary Command Council (1974-
1975) 
On April 5, 1974 the RCC decreed that Qadhafi be relieved of 
his political, administrative, and traditional duties so as to 
devote himself to ideological matters and mass organization. 
Major Jalloud (11), Qadhafi
1s right hand, took over his func-
tions . However, Qadhaf i remained Head of State and Commander 
of the Armed Forces (12). 
Rivalry between Qadhafi and Jalloud did not appear to be a 
factor for the changes. There were, nevertheless, signs of 
serious discontent among more moderate members of the RCC, who 
had affinities with dissatisfied army officers and middle 
class elements in Libyan society. These tensions culminated in 
an abortive coup in the middle of 1975 by Qadhafi
1s main 
opponents in the RCC. With the breakdown of collégial deci-
sion-making through the RCC, Qadhafi
1s personal leadership was 
decisively established, and only five of the original twelve 
members of the RCC remained. 
3.2 The reorganization of the Arab Socialist Union 
The ultimate aim of the elaboration of the second institution-
al system was to eliminate all intermediaries between the 
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For that reason, Qadhafi announced on April 27, 1975 fundamen-
tal changes in the structure of the ASU. A system of direct 
democracy was worked out: the new structure allowed the people 
to exercise its authority through the Basic People's Congres-
ses (BPC), the People's Committees, syndicates, trade unions, 
and the General People's Congress (GPC). Membership was now 
open to all Arabs inside and outside Libya (13). 
The first General Popular Congress was held from January 5 to 
18, 1976. Prime Minister Jalloud was unanimously elected 
Secretary-General of the Congress. The GPC also decided that 
the RCC (General Secretariat of the Congress) would continue 
to legislate in accordance with the powers given by the Con-
stitutional Declaration of 1969 (14). 
Meanwhile, the first part of Qadhafi's Green Book: "The Solu-
tion of the Problem of Democracy: the Authority of the People" 
had been published at the end of 1975. In this work Qadhafi 
set out to give a theoretical basis for his experiment in 
direct participatory democracy in Libya (15). 
3.3 The Declaration on the Establishment of the People's 
Authority (March 1977) 
An extraordinary GPC, held in Sebha (February 28 - March 2, 
1977), issued a four-point Declaration on the Establishment of 
the People's Authority. Four decrees that changed the Libyan 
institutions were added to the Declaration. The most important 
stipulations were: 1) the official name of the Libyan Arab 
Republic is the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
(16); 2) the Holy Koran is the law of the Society; 3) the 
popular direct authority is the basis of the political system; 
4) the defence of the homeland is the responsibility of every 
male and female citizen. 
The RCC was maintained but its name was changed to General 
Secretariat, in spite of the opposition of Qadhafi, who advo-
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General of the GPC. A General People's Committee was formed to 
carry out the tasks of the various former ministries. The 
title of "Minister" was replaced by that of "Secretary",- and 
Jalloud's post of Prime Minister was replaced by that of 
Chairman of the Popular Committee, now held by a civilian 
(17). 
The Declaration of March 2, 1977 only casted Qadhafi's speech 
of April 27, 1975 in an adequate juridical form and did not 
change the Libyan institutional system perceptibly. Qadhafi 
rejects all constitutions as man-made laws (18). Although no 
official Libyan source uses the term "constitution" for the 
Declaration of the Establishment of the People's Authority, 
this text can be considered a "constitutional document", i.e. 
a fundamental document that establishes the basis for the 
Libyan political and juridical structure. 
Libya's new political system of the Jamahiriya did not live up 
to Qadhafi's expectations. On the one hand, conflicts arose 
between the different tiers of the hierarchical system, resul-
ting in the isolation of higher political levels from the base 
and the inevitable creation of small, personal sectors of 
power. Furthermore, Qadhafi was dissatisfied with the level of 
public participation in politics, absenteeism in the BPCs 
being considerable (19). 
3.A The revolutionary committees and the Green Book (part II) 
From 1978 on, "revolutionary committees" formed "spontaneous-
ly" within the BPCs. Although not mentioned in the Green Book 
(Part I), Qadhafi assigned the revolutionary committees the 
task of encouraging participation and guiding the congresses 
according to the precepts of the Green Book (20). The real 
function of Libyan "red guards" was ideological surveillance. 
They were, in reality, a political police. 
The revolutionary committees played an important role in the 
implementation of the principles outlined in the second part 
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1s Green Book, "The Solution of the Economic Pro-
blem: Socialism", published early in 1978 (21). The main 
themes were "partners, not wage earners", "the house belongs 
to its occupant", and "land is no one's property". Workers 
committees began to take over the management of their enter-
prises and houses were redistributed on a large scale. These 
measures obviously posed a serious threat to the middle class, 
the traditional opponents to Qadhafi
1s regime. 
3.5 The division between government and revolution 
In March 1979, at a special meeting of the GPC, Qadhafi for-
mally relinquished his position as secretary-general of the 
GPC to devote himself, together with the remaining members of 
the RCC, exclusively to "perfecting" the revolution. Qadhafi
1s 
formal title became "Leader of the Revolution". 
Immediately, the functions of the new General Secretariat of 
the GPC were seriously restricted. The BPCs (and GPC) conse-
quently continued to share political authority with the revo-
lutionary committees and the RCC, which had placed itself 
above the political process but remained at the heart of the 
revolution. 
4. MILITARIZATION, OPPOSITION, AND FALLING OIL REVENUES 
The concept of an "armed people" is an essential part of the 
Libyan revolution. Since 1979, military training has been 
introduced in universities, schools, and enterprises for both 
men and women. Qadhafi's ultimate plan is to replace the 
regular army by a people's army. The creation of a people's 
army is at the same time used by the Libyan authorities as an 
occasion to relaunch revolutionary mobilization (22). 
It is very difficult to gauge the extent of domestic opposi-
tion to Qadhafi's regime. A large part of the population has 
benefited directly from the revolution. Nevertheless, rumours 
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religious leaders, and students, have circulated for years and 
reports of serious incidents emerge from time to time. Al-
though opposition abroad is too divided to be effective, it 
clearly troubles Qadhafi
1s regime. In 1980 Qadhafi issued an 
ultimatum to Libyan exiles abroad to return to Libya or face 
"physical liquidation" by the revolutionary committees. Since 
1980 several Libyans known to be hostile to the regime have 
been assassinated in Western countries (23). 
Falling oil revenues (from $ 22 billion in 1980 to $ 5 billion 
in 1988), due to the world oil glut, have had a serious impact 
on Libya's political and economic life. 
For the first time since 1969, the Libyan population was con-
fronted with economic hardship and a declining standard of li-
ving. It is only logical that this economic decline also has 
political consequences. Because of the important oil revenues 
during the first decennium of the September revolution, the 
Libyan political and institutional laboratory was able to 
function with an apparent consensus. But as oil sales con-
tinued to collapse, the Jamahiriya had, for the first time, to 
prove the real viability of its political and institutional 
experiment (24). 
The fall in oil earnings coincided with a dramatic escalation 
of the conflict between Libya and the United States. Since 
Ronald Reagan took over power at the White House in January 
1981, relations between the two countries had constantly 
deteriorated. Diplomatic relations were broken off and a full 
trade embargo on Libyan goods was imposed. As these measures 
proved ineffective to precipitate Qadhafi's downfall, Washing-
ton resorted to a policy of military confrontation. Twice the 
American and Libyan army clashed in the disputed Gulf of 
Sirte. Against a background of alleged Libyan involvement in 
"terrorist" activities, the Reagan administration decided for 
a powerful military assault on the apparatus of the Libyan 
state. There is even evidence that Qadhafi was himself a 
target of the operation. The attack was meant to produce 
tensions within the Libyan armed forces, prompting discon 
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(Archives 'Het Volk') tented officers into an attempted coup d'état (25). 
5. THE AMERICAN RAID AND ITS AFTERMATH 
The bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi on April 15, 1986 did not 
have the effect Washington had expected. Qadhafi was not 
killed during the attack and his regime was not overthrown. 
The American action temporarily boosted the popular appeal of 
the Libyan colonel as "victim of American imperialism". More-
over it delayed the proces, of growing opposition and discon-
tent in Libya, caused by the deep economic malaise afflicting 
the country after the oil price crash. 
Nevertheless, the Libyan leader was emotionally shaken by the 
events of April 15, 1986. For several months he did not appear 
in public and for more than a year all political life in Libya 
was at a standstill. 
Early 1988, amid a climate of economic chaos and growing 
repression by the Revolutionary Committees, Qadhafi returned 
to the political scene and declared that the Libyan revolution 
had entered a new phase. He promised that personal freedom 
would be enhanced, private enterprise encouraged and the power 
of the feared Revolutionary Committees curbed. 
In a speech to the GPC in March 1988, the Colonel announced 
that all prisoners would be freed (except those accused of 
"conspiring with foreign circles" and those sentenced for 
violent crimes). To suit the action to the word, he climbed on 
to a bulldozer and demolished the gates of Tripoli's central 
prison. Shortly afterwards, an amnesty for all imprisoned 
foreigners was declared. 
In a second address to the GPC, Qadhafi called for the aboli-
tion of capital punishment (excluding again the above men-
tioned categories). At the same time, he demanded the aboli-
tion of courts operated by the Revolutionary Committees and 
asked that all arbitrary arrests should be stopped. Neverthe-
less, he stressed that the loyalty of the revolutionaries was 
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selves that needed curbing but their abuses of power. 
Economic changes have been no less significant than human 
rights reforms. In a speech on the economy, Qadhafi called for 
the abolition of the state control of medium- and small-scale 
industries such as construction, agriculture and manufactur-
ing. Workers should take responsibility for their own workpla-
ces through cooperatives, as required by the Green Book (Part 
II) and its ubiquitous slogan: "Partners, not wage earners". 
Large-scale industries such as steel, petrochemicals and oil 
would have to remain under state control. 
At the same time, the reopening of private shops has sparked a 
revival in local economic activity. Improvement in regional 
and international relations has increased the availibility of 
goods for production and consumption (26). 
The so-called "spring of Tripoli" created an atmosphere of op-
timism and enthusiasm, albeit cautious, among Libyans. Qad-
hafi
1 s position now seems more secure than a few years ago. 
His sudden embrace of economic and political liberalisation is 
not to be seen as a break with the past. 
Qadhafi is a master of political survival. On September 1, 
1989, the twentieth anniversary of his revolution will be 
celebrated. On the one hand, Qadhafi
1s legitimacy rests on a 
record of revolutionary achievement. In only two decades, he 
has secured a profound political, economic and social trans-
formation of Libyan society. On the other hand, the fact that 
he has endured is not only a result of his revolutionary and 
populist policy. In a country that has extensively suffered 
from foreign domination, Qadhafi's assertion of Libyan pride 
and identity has proved enduringly popular (27). 
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